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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN WESTERN LIFE INSURANCE 
C0~1PANY I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
VONICE W. HOOKER and HELEN M. MALLARD ) 
a/k/a HELEN MARGURITE HOOKER, ) 
Defendants. 
HELEN !1. MALLARD, a/k/ a HELEN 
MARGURITE HOOKER, 
v. 
Counterclaim Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
AMERICAN WESTERN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Counterclaim Defendant and 
Respondent. 
HELEN M. MALLARD, a/k/a HELEN 
MARGURITE HOOKER, 
v. 
Cross Complaint Plain~if f 
and Aopellan t, 
VONICE W. HOOKER, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Cross Complaint Defendant ) 
and Respondent. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
Case No. 16596 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to determine the person lawfully 
entitled to the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the 
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life of Ronald Hooker. American Western Life Insurance 
Company (hereinafter "American Western") paid the proceeds of 
the policy (Policy #44498) to defendant Vonice Hooker, but 
brought this action when defendant Helen Mallard later claimed 
the proceeds. 
Defendant Helen Mallard counterclaimed for the proceeds 
of Policy #44498 and for the proceeds of an additional policy 
on Ronald Hooker's life as well, Policy #43476. She also 
cross-claimed against defendant Venice Hooker individually 
for the proceeds of Policy #44498 which Vonice had received 
from American Western, and filed a third-party complaint 
against Venice as executrix of Ronald Hooker's estate, claiming 
the estate was unjustly enriched bv receiving the proceeds 
of Policy #44498. 
Defendant Vonice Hooker counterclaimed against American 
Western, claiming the company had wrongfully garnished the 
balance of the proceeds of Policy i44498 remaining in her 
checking account at the col!Ul\encement of the action. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER cou:q'I' 
Defendant Helen Mallard moved for sUI!Ul\ary judgment 
against American Western on both Policy #44498 and Policy 
#43476. 
Defendant Venice Hooker movea. for partial sUI!Ul\ary 
judgment against American ~·/estern and Helen Mallard on Policy 
#44498 and against Helen Mallard on her cross-complaint; and 
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for summary judgment against Helen Mallard on her third-party 
complaint. 
American Western moved for partial summary judgment 
against Helen Mallard on her counterclaim. 
The court ruled as follows: 
1. It granted Venice Hooker's motion for summary 
judgment against American Western, dismissed the complaint 
with prejudice, and released the balance of the proceeds of 
Policy #44498 to Venice Hooker. 
2. It granted Vonice Hooker's motion for sumrnary 
judgment against Helen Mallard and dismissed Mallard's cross-
claim with prejudice. 
3. It granted Vonice Hooker's motion for summary 
judgment as executrix of Ronald Hooker's estate against Helen 
Mallard and dismissed Mallard's third-party complaint with 
?rejudice. 
4. It denied Helen Mallard's motion for summary 
judgment against American Western, granted American Western's 
motion for summary judgment against Helen Mallard, and dis-
missed Mallard's counterclaim against American Western with 
prejudice. 
Defendant Helen Mallard moved for reconsideration, 
which the court denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
American Western seeks affirmation of the trial court's 
order and dismissal of Helen Mallard's appeal. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1972, Ronald Hooker insured his life by taking out 
Policy #43476 issued by American Western. He had just con-
structed an apartment building and had financed it by 
mortgaging the house which his wife, Helen, had previouslv 
owned free and clear. (Depo. Helen Mallard 40). He bought 
the insurance to pay off the apartment indebtedness in the 
event of his death. It was a 20-year decreasing term policy. 
The face amount was $75,000 and Helen was the beneficiary. 
(R. 140, 147). 
In 1973, Mr. Hooker and Helen built a new store for his 
appliance business. They borrowed further against both the 
house and apartments to finance the new store. At Helen's 
insistence, Mr. Hooker purchased an additional 20-year term 
life insurance policy, #44498, from American Western to pay off 
the additional debt on the house. ( Depo. Helen Mallard 41-42). 
The face amount was $75,000, and Helen was the beneficiary. 
In 1977, Mr. Hooker sold the apartments and paid off the debt 
on Helen's house. 
Helen was the bookkeeper for the store, and her duties 
included payment of insurance, including the two life 
insurance policies. (Depo. Helen ~1allard 10, 11, 15, 24). 
According to her testimony, she handled all contact with the 
agents, processed all paperwork, with Ronald's aid where 
necessary, and made sure the premiums were paid. 
-4-
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According to Helen's testimony, in 1974, acting under 
the belief that the proceeds of the Policies would be paid 
into Ronald's estate unless she was named owner as well as 
beneficiary, Helen had Ronald sign change of ownership desig-
nations on both policies naming her as owner. (Depo. Helen 
Mallard 9, 10, 12; R. 105-106). American Western received 
the forms in July of 1974. The form for Policy #43476 was 
properly attached as a rider to that policy. (Depo. Elspeth 
Forbes 13-14; Depo. Helen Mallard, Exhibits P-1, P-2). The 
form for Policy #44498 was not attached as a rider to that 
policy, but was apparently misfiled in the folder for 
Policy #43476. (Depo. Elspeth Forbes 13-141 Deoo. Helen 
Mallard, Exhibit P-3). American Western sent a letter to 
Ronald confirming that the requested change of ownership on 
Policy #43476 had been recorded and enclosing a copy to be 
filed with his policy. No such letter was ever sent on 
Policy #44498. (Depo. Elspeth Forbes 14-15; Depo. Helen 
Mallard, Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3). Although Helen claims she 
handled all such matters, she made no inquiry why she received 
notice of change on one policy but not on the other. (Depo. 
Helen Mallard 17-18). After the change, American Western 
continued to address all correspondence and premium notices 
to Ronald (Depo. Helen Mallard 45-46), although Helen contends 
she continued to handle payment. (De~o. Helen Mallard 24) · 
-5-
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In December 1975, Ronald and Helen were divorced. 
Ronald's company, Hooker's Appliance, had paid the annual 
life insurance premiums current to December 1976. (Depo. 
Helen Mallard 24). No provision was made in the divorce 
decree about life insurance, and the parties did not discuss 
the matter at the time of the divorce. (Depo. Helen Mallard 
46; R. 133-134). Helen remarried in the spring of 1976. 
After her remarriage, she came to an oral agreement with 
Ronald that he would keep the premiums paid and would inform 
her before letting them lapse. (Depo. Helen Mallard 46-47). 
She made no further inquiries of Ronald or American Western 
apout the policies during Ronald's lifetime. When she moved 
from the parties' prior address, she made no effort to 
inform American Western of her new address. (Depa. Helen 
Mallard 25). 
Shortly before Ronald sold the apartments and paid 
off the debt on Helen's house, he allowed Policv #43476 to 
lapse. He did not make the annual premium payment due 
December 1976 on the policy, and it lapsed for nonpayment at 
the end of the policy's grace period 31 days later. He kept 
Policy #44498 current but, representing himself to be the 
owner of the policy, submitted a request in December 1976 to 
change the beneficiary to Venice Hooker, whom he had married 
in October of that year. American Western recorded the chanqe 
of beneficiary by attaching a copy of the form to Policy #4449 8· 
(Depo. Elspeth Forbes, Exhibit D-1). 
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Ronald died September 17, 1977. Venice filed a claim 
on Policy #44498, which American Western promptly paid by a 
check in the sum of $67,500 dated September 27, 1977. on 
October 19, 1977, Helen's counsel demanded payment to Helen 
on Policy #43476. (Depo. Helen Mallard, Exhibit P-4). Upon 
checking that file, American Western found the misfiled change 
of ownership designation on Policy #44498. American Western 
then filed this action to determine the person entitled to 
payment on Policy #44498 and attached the balance of the pro-
ceeds of the policy still remaining in Venice's checking 
account, about $20,000. 
ARGUMENT 
At the time American Western commenced this action, 
it did not know sufficient facts to determine the proper 
beneficiary of Policy #44498. It therefore sought a declara-
tion by the court of which defendant was entitled to the 
proceeds. The undisputed facts later developed by discovery 
demonstrate, however, that the court below ruled correctly 
that Venice Hooker was the policy beneficiary. This argument 
is accordingly submitted in support of the trial court's 
ruling. 
POINT I 
THE PROCEEDS OF POLICY #44498 WERE PROPERLY 
PAID TO VONICE HOOKER AS BENEFICIARY 
The trial court ruled properly that Vonice Hooker was 
the beneficiary of Policy #44498 at the time of Ronald Hooker's 
-7-
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death. Ronald, as the insured, had the right by the explicit 
terms of the policy to designate Vonice as beneficiary and to 
agree to any other changes or amendments. He made Vonice the 
beneficiary by proper form executed December 17, 1976, which 
American Western attached as a rider to the policy. American 
Western properly paid Vonice the proceeds of the policy and 
is not obligated to Helen, the prior beneficiary. 
Ronald's assignment to Helen of rights of ownership in 
July of 1974 did not divest him of the right to change the 
beneficiary for two reasons. First, under the explicit terms 
of the policy, he retained the right as the insured to agree 
to changes or amendments to the policy. Second, the intent 
of the parties, as disclosed by Helen's own testimony, was 
that the assignment to Helen was not absolute, but was for 
the purposes of avoiding probate and securing payment of 
the mortgage on Helen's house. Once Ronald had removed the 
mortgage by payment of the debt, he was free to dispose of 
the policy proceeds as he chose. 
A. Ronald Hooker had the right as the 
insured to designate Vonice the beneficiarv. 
The clear and unambiguous terms of the policy control 
the various rights and obligations of the insured, the owner, 
the beneficiary, and the insurer. Under the terms of Policy 
#44498, Ronald Hooker had full authority as the insured to 
make changes in or amendments to the policy. The oolicy 
provides: 
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Control of Policy -- During the minority of the 
Insured ~he ri~ht to exercise all privileges 
under this Policy and to agree with the Company 
as to any change in or amendment to this Policv 
s~all.vest ~uccessively, during their respectiv~ 
life~imes, in th7 ?wner, the Beneficiary, the 
Contingent Beneficiary, if any, and the Insured. 
After ~he Insured has attained his majority, 
such rights shall vest solely in the Insured 
unless otherwise provided in the Policy. (emphasis 
added) (Depa. Helen Mallard, Exhibit P-6). 
Appellant Helen Mallard argues that the 
change of ownership form executed by Ronald Hooker in 1974 
operated to divest Ronald of all such rights and vest them 
exclusively in Helen. What Appellant ignores is that the 
form transferred only the rights of the owner, not of the 
insured. As between the owner and the insured, the explicit 
language quoted above allocates to the insured the right to 
amend the policy. So long as Ronald, not Helen, was the 
insured under the policy, the right to change the policy 
remained vested in Ronald. 
Twice in her Statement of Facts, Appellant states that 
the change of policy ownership designation named her as 
"irrevocable beneficiary." (Appellant's Brief 3, 6). That 
is factually false and legally wrong. No such words, nor 
indeed any mention whatever of "revocability" of beneficiary 
appears on the documents. As to the legal conclusion that 
Helen was thereby "named" irrevocable beneficiary, the policy 
terms quoted above clearly reserve to the insured the right 
to change or amend the policy, notwithstanding the rights of 
the owner. 
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B. The 1974 change of ownership was not absolute 
and did not divest Ronald Hooker of ownership. 
When Ronald assigned ownership of the policy to Helen 
in 1974, he did it in an attempt to avoid probate, and as 
security for repayment of the mortgage he had placed on Helen's 
house. When he repaid the loan and removed the mortgage in 
1977, the assignment of the policy terminated, and Ronald 
could designate Vonice as beneficiary. 
Parol evidence is admissible to show that an assignment 
of a life insurance policy, although absolute on its face, 
was intended only conditionally. In Moser v. Moser, 117 
Ariz. 312, 572 P.2d 446 (1977), a divorce action, a husband 
had assigned life insurance policies to his wife by assignments 
absolute on their face. The court stateCT: 
Appellant [the wife] contends that the assign-
ment of the policies was conclusive and that 
appellee cannot contend that she [the wife] was 
not the absolute owner. We do not agree. As 
we remarked in Neely v. Neely, 115 App. 47, 
563 P.2d 302 (1977), a case also involving the 
transfer of ownership of insurance policies, 
the mere form of a life insurance policy is 
not conclusive as to either ownership or whether 
a gift has been made. Donative intent must be 
ascertained in light of all the circumstances. 
572 P.2d at 448. 
Examining the intent of the parties as demonstrated by their 
conduct, the court found that the husband, as here, intended 
merely to gain certain probate and estate tax benefits, and 
had no intent to give up the incidents of ownership and 
control of the policy. 
-10-
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The court in Neely, cited above, came to the same 
conclusion under similar facts. J · ust as in the present case, 
the wife contended that: 
[W)hen.one spouse h~s turned over ownership 
of an insurance policy to another spouse in 
order to avoid estate taxes it is conclusive 
and incontrovertible that a gift has been 
created. 
563 P.2d at 305. 
The court disposed of the wife's argument in two 
words: "We disagree." Id. The court found that although the 
language of the assignment was absolute, the intent of the 
parties was to bypass the husband's estate in avoidance of 
estate taxes, and the husband had therefore not divested 
himself of ownership or control of the policies. The assign-
ment of ownership in the present case was for a similar, 
although mistaken, purpose: an attempt to avoid probate. 
Appellant's testimony is: 
Shortly after the policies were taken out, the 
insurance agent was in the store one day talking 
about ownerships of the policies. He advised me 
that if I was not the owner and anything should 
happen to the Decedent, Ronald Hooker, that the 
insurance would have to go into probate, and in 
order to stoD this, I would have to be the owner. 
It was at this time that the policies were changed, 
namina me as owner, and this was the understanding 
that i had. 
(R. 106). 
Her testimony in her deposition is the same. After 
apparently coming to a misunderstanding that unless the 
beneficiary is also the owner, the proceeds will be paid into 
-11-
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the estate and not be available to pay bills, she requested 
the agent to prepare the change of ownership papers, 
"because if this is the case, I would like 
the insurance policies put as me as the 
owner." And so this was done at that time. 
Depo. Helen Mallard 9, 10. 
Appellant reiterates the same testimony at page 12 of her 
deposition. 
By Appellant's repeated admission, then, it is undisputed 
that the sole purpose of the change of ownership was to attempt 
to avoid probate. Under the reasoning of the Moser and Neely 
cases, such an assignment does not divest the insured of his 
rights as owner. 
The most that can be said for the assignment is that 
it was made to assure Helen that the original purpose of the 
policy would be carried out: the mortgage on her house would 
be paid. Such assignments to assure payment of debt are 
quite common, and can be shown by parol evidence. In Price 
v. First Nat'l Bank of Atchison, 60 Kan. 743, 64 P. 639 (1901), 
a husband, as insured, and wife, as owner and beneficiary, 
made an assignment to a creditor bank absolute on its face. 
The court held: 
Parol evidence was admissible for the purpose 
of showing that, although such assignment was 
absolute on its face, the real intent of the 
parties was that the insurance policy should be 
turned over to the bank under such assignment 
for the purpose of collateral security merely. 
64 P. at 641. 
See also Albrent v. Spencer, 275 Wis. 127, 81 N.W.2d 555 1957); 
Boyle v. Crimm, 363 Mo. 731, 253 S.W.2d 149 (1952). 
-12-
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In the present case, Helen's own testimony shows 
unequivocally that Policy #44498 was taken out to assure 
payment of the mortgage Ronald had placed on her house to 
secure his business debts. I h d n er eposition, she states: 
Q The second policy [#44498] was taken out to 
basically cover obligations for the new store; 
that is correct, isn't it? 
A I took it out because I figured it would 
cover the loan I had on my home. 
Q It was not taken out for the new store? 
A Well, I borrowed--my parents built my home, 
and my home was free and clear, and I borrowed 
money against my home to build the store. so 
it was to pay for it if something happened, so 
I would have my home. 
Depo. Helen Mallard 24. 
At most, then, Ronald's assignment of the policies to her must 
be construed as being made in an attempt to avoid probate and 
to secure payment of the debt. 
The effect of an assignment of a life insurance policy 
as security for a debt is not to divest the insured of his 
interest in the policy but merely to create a lien in favor 
of the assignee to the extent of the debt. Once the debt is 
paid, the policy continues in effect as if there had been no 
assignment. Males v. New York Life Ins. Co., 367 N.Y.S.2d 
575, 48 A.D.2d SO (N.Y.A.D. 1975). In Green v. American Nat'l 
Ins. Co., 452 S.W.2d l (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), the court held 
that a creditor transferree of a life insurance policy acquires 
no greater interest than will pay the debt. No matter what 
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form the instrument of transfer assumes, the court stated, 
it must be construed either as a mortgage to secure the debt 
or a pledge of enough of the proceeds to pay the debt. See 
also Albrent v. Spencer, cited above; Parramore v. Williams, 
215 Ga. 179, 109 S.E.2d 745 (1937). 
In the present case, the assignment to Helen, although 
absolute in form, conveyed at most only an interest sufficient 
to discharge the debt on her house. Once Ronald had dis-
charged that debt, which he did in 1977, the policies continued 
in effect as if there had been no assignment. 
Moreover, the conduct of the parties after the assign-
ment demonstrates unequivocally that neither Ronald, Helen nor 
American Western ever construed the 1974 change of ownership 
document on Policy #44498 to vest absolute ownership rights 
in Helen. Under universally accepted canons of construction 
of insurance policies, the construction placed upon the policy 
by the parties themselves, as demonstrated by their conduct, 
will be applied by the court. 
In Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Taylor, 76 Kan. 392, 
91 P. 1070 (1907), a dispute about the coverage of a fire 
insurance policy, the court stated: 
If the parties acted upon a contract ambiguous 
in any way, and such action indicates their 
mutual understanding as to its ambiguous 
provisions, the courts will usually adopt 
such interpretation as most likely to accord 
with the original intent. 
91 P. at 1072. 
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In Continental Cas. Co. v. Goodnature, 170 Okla. 
477, 41 P.2d 77 (1935), construing the extent of coverage 
under a workman's compensation policy, the court stated: 
When a policy of insurance is susceptible 
of a construction placed thereon by the 
parties thereto, such construction-should 
ordinarily be adopted bv the courts as 
controlling. -
41 P.2d at 80. 
In Candelaria v. Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 60 Colo. 
340, 153 P. 447 (1915), the court found that the parties had 
agreed to a construction of a life insurance policy that it 
would lapse at the due date of the next premium if not paid, 
and a loan on the policy would be extinguished. Although no 
language in the policy so provided, the court stated: 
This construction not being in conflict with 
any language in the policy, nor in violation 
of any statute, authorized regulation, nor 
against public policy, the court ought not to 
be called upon later to put to it a different 
meaning than agreed to and acted upon by the 
parties to it and those interested therein. 
153 P. at 448. 
In Chemtec Midwest Services, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of 
North America, 290 F. Supp. 106 (W.D.Wis. 1968), the court 
considered whether a liability policy covering injuries 
arising by "accident" covered breach of warranty as well as 
negligence claims. The court stated: 
Where an insurance contract is uncertain and 
the intention of the parties is not clearly 
ascertainable from the policy itself, the 
courts will take into consideration the appar-
ent object or purpose of the insuranc7 and, 
in the context of the policy, the subJect m~tter 
of the insurance, the situation of the pa:t1es, 
and the circumstances surrounding the making 
of the contract. 
290 F. Supp. at 109. 
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see also Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. 
Pa. 1966) at 411, aff'd 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967); 12 Couch 
on Insurance 2d 45:5; 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 
§ 4317. 
In the present situation, the conduct of the parties 
unequivocally demonstrates none of them ever had the intent 
to transfer to Helen the ownership of Policy #44498. First, 
the sole reason that Helen requested the change of ownership 
was a mistake of law: she thought that unless she was both 
owner and beneficiary, the proceeds would be paid to Ronald's 
estate, not directly to her as beneficiary. Thus, at the 
time of transfer, the parties had no intent to transfer the 
right to designate the beneficiary but merely to avoid 
probate of the proceeds. 
Second, American Western never recorded the proposed 
change in the file of Policy #44498. The company never sent 
notice of change of ownership to either Helen or Ronald on 
Policy #44498, in contrast to the notice of change sent on 
Policy #43476. Third, Helen never objected to receiving 
notice of change on one policy but not the other, although 
according to her testimony she was in full charge of all 
insurance matters. Had she really intended that both policies 
be changed, she could have been expected to take some action 
upon being told that only Policy #43476 had been changed. 
Fourth, American Western continued to treat Ronald as 
retaining all incidents of ownership of the policy. It 
addressed all notices to him, including the notice of change 
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of ownership and all premium notices. From July 1974 through 
December 1975, Helen knew that American ~estern was for all 
practical purposes treating Ronald as the owner. She 
acquiesced in this arrangement, paying from appliance company 
funds the premiums addressed to Ronald. She never took a 
single step to assert any right of ownership herself. 
Fifth, after the divorce, Helen did nothing whatever 
about the insurance, leaving all decisions and actions to 
Ronald. She never even inquired whether the premiums had been 
paid. She made no provision in the divorce decree for main-
taining insurance. She did not even bother to inform the 
company of her whereabouts when she moved. Had she really 
considered herself the owner of the policies, with full 
rights of control, she could have been expected to exercise, 
protect or at least inquire about the policies. 
Sixth, when she did make a claim, through her counsel, 
she claimed only under Policy #43476. Clearly, she never 
considered herself the owner of Policy #44498 or she would 
have claimed under that policy as well. 
According to the undisputed facts in the record, then, 
it is apparent that the original purpose of the policy was 
to secure repayment of the loan on Helen's house, which Ronald 
later discharged; that the sole purpose of the assignment was 
a mistaken attempt to avoid probate; that Ronald continued 
to exercise all rights of ownership of the policy after the 
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assignment; and that Helen acquiesced in that understanding 
and never herself evidenced any intent to exercise any owner-
ship rights. This court should not allow Helen now to come 
forward for the first time and, contrary to the manifest 
intent of the parties, claim absolute ownership of the 
policy. 
POINT II 
POLICY #43476 LAPSED FOR NONPAYMENT 
Appellant does not dispute that the premium on Policy 
#43476 due December 1976 has never been paid or tendered. 
She admits that American Western sent notice of lapse of 
the policy to Ronald Hooker at the address all previous 
correspondence and notices had borne. (Appellant's Brief 
17-18; Depo. Helen Mallard 45, 46). She contends, however, that 
the policy could not lapse because she herself never received 
notice of lapse. The foolishness of this contention is 
obvious when it is examined in light of the explicit terms 
of the policy, the case law, and the statutory scheme 
regulating lapse of life insurance. 
Policy #43476 provides unequivocally that it lapses 
automatically 31 days after any premium remains unpaid: 
If any premium is not paid when due, such 
premium shall be in default, and at the 
expiration of the grace period hereinafter 
provided, this Policy shall lapse as of the 
date to which premiums have been paid and 
shall become of no value. 
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* * * 
A grace period of thirty-one days without 
interest ~ill be allowed for the payment of 
eac~ premium after the first during which 
~eriod of grace the Policy will continue 
in ~orce. If death occurs within the grace 
period, the premium, if unpaid, will be 
deducted from the amount payable hereunder. 
The policy also provides for reinstatement during 
the lifetime of the insured: 
(a) within fifteen days after the expiration 
of the grace period for the premium in default 
without evidence of insurability; or (b) there: 
after but within five years from the due date 
of the premium in default, upon production of 
evidence of insurability satisfactory to the 
Company. The reinstatement of this Policy 
shall be subject to the payment of all overdue 
premiums with interest on such premiums of 5% 
per annum compounded annually. 
Unless some statutory or common law doctrine to the 
contrary prevails, then, the policy lapsed even without the 
notice that American Western sent. 
This court has already examined and rejected Appellant's 
proposed doctrine that an insurer must send notice before 
lapse. In Eme:ry v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 89 Utah 
430, 57 P.2d 747 (1936), the insured had borrowed against the 
full loan value of a 20-year endowment policy, and therefore 
no loan value was available to apply against premiums coming 
due. The trial court found that premiums had not been paid 
when due, and that the policy had been forfeited according 
to its terms. The appellant there argued that the insurer 
was precluded from forfeiting the policy because it had 
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not taken certain steps required by the explicit terms of the 
policy for forfeiture for failure to repay a policy loan. 
This court emphatically rejected that contention, however, 
on the ground that the policy was forfeited automatically 
and without any action by the insurer for failure to pay 
premiums, regardless of the status of the loan. The court 
stated: 
The policy comes into existence and continues 
to remain a binding contract only upon the 
consideration of the payment of the monthly 
premiums of $4.22 payable on delivery of the 
policy and a like amount on or before the 8th 
day of each month thereafter. Failure to pay 
as thus provided would work a lapse of the 
policy. 
* * * 
The loan against the policy having substantially 
consumed the cash surrender value, and there 
being no dividend accumulations, the insured 
having applied the full amount of the loan to 
the payment of premiums, of necessity the 
policy lapsed upon default of payment of 
premiums. 
57 P.2d at 748-749. 
In the present case, Appellant cannot even point to any 
explicit policy terms upon which she could rely to impose a 
duty on American Western to take overt steps before forfeiting 
the policy. She alleges only a "custom" of sending premium 
notices. American Western is under no such duty, and the 
policy lapsed automatically upon nonpayment of the premium. 
The ruling in Emery is in complete accord with the 
universally accepted rule that in the absence of special 
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provisions which deal with lapse, the operation of provisions 
suspending or forfeiting insurance contracts is not affected 
by the failure of the insurer to take some affirmative action 
or to declare a suspension or forfeiture before lapse. Beeman 
v. Farmers Pioneer Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 104 Iowa 83, 73 N.W. 597 
(1897); Continental Ins. Co. v. Stratton, 185 Ky. 523, 215 
S.W. 416, 8 A.L.R. 391 (1919); Gifford v. Workmen's Benefit 
Ass'n, 105 Me. 17, 72 A. 680 (1908); Robinson v. Continental 
Ins. Co., 76 Mich. 641, 43 N.W. 647 (1889); Phenix Ins. Co. 
v. Bachelder, 32 Neb. 490, 49 N.W. 217 (1891); Davis v. Home 
Ins. Co., 127 Tenn. 330, 155 s.w. 131 (1913). See also 
8 A.L.R. 395 and cases cited thereunder. Where the continuance 
of the policy is dependent upon payment and no contract 
provisions extend coverage absent notice of lapse, no notice 
is necessary for coverage to lapse. Hensley v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 200 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa 1972); Wisniewski 
v. Prudential Ins. Corp., 422 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1970); Miner 
v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 451 F.2d 1273 (10th 
Cir. 1976). 
A survey of the present Utah statutory scheme regulating 
lapse of life insurance policies also reveals no requirement 
of notice. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31-22-2 (Repl. 1966), 
the instant policy has a grace period wherein the policy shall 
continue in force, during which period of grace the payment 
may be made. A policy may be reinstated at any time within 
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three years from the date of premium default provided 
insurability can be shown under Utah Code Ann. § 31-22-9 
(Repl. 1966). Utah Code Ann. § 31-22-3 (Repl. 1966) allows 
the insurer to contest the payment of benefits under the 
policy for nonpayment of premiums and recognizes the 
ability of the insurer to terminate the policy for nonpayment 
of premiums. Nowhere in the nonforfeiture provisions (Utah 
Code Ann. § 31-22-13, et seq. (Repl. 1966)) is there any 
notice requirement. 
Implicit in the statutory scheme is the right of an 
insurer to cancel, terminate or otherwise forfeit the policy 
µpon a party's failure to pay premium payments as due. As 
the Utah Supreme Court noted in Decker v. New York Life Ins. 
Co., 94 Utah 166, 76 P.2d 568 (1938), the very purpose of 
the automatic nonforfeiture provisions is to give the 
insured the net value of his policy upon cancellation or 
lapse. Where, as here, a term policy has no cash surrender 
value or net value, no amount is due the insured upon the 
automatic termination of the policy for failure to pay 
premium payments. In short, nowhere in the insurance 
provisions of the Utah Code is there any provision that 
notice is required for a life insurance policy to be cancelled. 
American Western was under no statutory obligation to send 
notice to Helen Mallard as a condition of lapse. 
-22-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Notwithstanding the lack of any contractual, 
statutory or common law duty, however, Appellant contends 
that American Western is estopped from declaring the policy 
lapsed according to its terms because the company failed 
to send her notice of lapse. Under familiar principles of 
estoppel, where an insurance company misleads an insured 
by a long-established custom at variance with the terms of 
the policy (such as accepting late payments or sending notice 
of premiums due) and the insured comes to rely upon that 
custom, the insurer cannot suddenly discontinue the custom 
without warning and insist on strict compliance with the 
policy to the detriment of the insured. In Pester v. Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 186 Neb. 793, 186 N.W.2d 711 (1971), quoted 
by Appellant (Appellant's Brief 21), the elements of estoppel 
in these circumstances are laid out. They are 
1. An established custom, followed continuously 
for many years, of sending notice of 
premiums due; 
2. Reliance by the insured on the practice, so 
that the insured made no other effort to 
keep track; 
3. sudden and unexplained termination of the 
l~ng-established custom to the detriment of 
the insured. 
-~p_pellant has raised no factual In the present case, ~ 
b t th existence of even one of these question whatever a ou e 
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elements, let alone all three. Not only is there no evidence 
of a long-established custom, there is no evidence that 
American Western ever sent any notice whatever addressed to 
Helen. Helen could not come to rely upon receiving premium 
notices, because she herself had never received one, and 
relied on her ex-husband to take care of them. American Western 
did not depart from its prior practice, it followed it exactly: 
it sent notice to Ronald at his address on the books of the 
company, just as it had always done before. 
Appellant has no evidence of the first and most 
critical element above, establishment of a custom or practice 
for many years of sending notice of premiums. In Okamura v. 
Time Ins. Co., 24 Utah 2d 209, 468 P.2d 958 (1970), the trial 
court ruled that the insurer had accepted one premium payment 
after expiration of the policy's 31-day grace period and 
was therefore estopped from terminating the policy when the 
next premium was tendered six days past the expiration of the 
grace period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: 
We are of the opinion that the acceptance of 
one prior premium after the due date is 
insufficient to constitute a custom or usage 
waiving a requirement of prompt payment. A 
custom or usage exists only when followed 
for a substantial period of time. 
468 P.2d at 959. 
In the present case, the record is uncontroverted that 
Appellant never received even a single notice of premium due 
addressed to her. If American Western can be said to have 
established any custom or usage over such a short period of 
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time this policy existed, that custom was to do exactly what 
the company did here: send notice addressed to Ronald at 
his address on the books of the company. 
There is likewise no factual issue about the second 
element of estoppel, that Helen relied upon any custom estab-
lished by American Western. Her testimony is unequivocal 
that she relied not on her own efforts but on Ronald to take 
care of the insurance after the divorce. She states: 
Q. Did your husband Ron indicate that he would 
forward to you any requests for payment of 
premiums on the policies? 
A. He said he would handle it. I said, "Are 
you sure, because if you don't, then I'll 
take care of it." 
He said, "No, don't worry, I'll take care 
of it." And that was it. 
Depo. Helen Mallard 25. 
Later, she clarifies her understanding with her ex-
husband: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
P. •• 
And in the summer of 1976, you asked him 
whether he was going to handle the 
insurance? 
I asked him if he was going to keep up the 
insurance policies, and he said ~e'd handle 
them. I said, "Well, if you decide not to, 
let me know." And he said he would. 
He would let vou know if he didn't handle 
them; is that right? 
Right. 
Depo. Helen Mallard 47. 
-25-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
She expected American Western to deal directly with Ronald 
about payment of premiums, obviously, because she expected him 
to pay them. She acquiesced in the arrangement for American 
western to send notices to Ronald, with full knowledge of it, 
even after the divorce. She did not require a provision about 
the insurance in the divorce decree. She cannot now be heard 
to complain that American Western continued to send notices, 
including notice of lapse, to Ronald in accordance with the 
custom she had agreed to. 
Moreover, whatever custom American Western had followed 1 
during Ronald and Helen's marriage, it could hardly be 
to know what Helen wanted in the changed circumstances 
expected i 
following I 
the divorce unless she disclosed her wishes to the company. 
I The last annual policy notice before the 1976 lapse was 
in December 1975, while Helen was still married to Ronald. 
At that time, notice to Ronald was sufficient to notify Helen. 
Yet Helen made no effort to make a different arrangement with 
American Western after the divorce to meet the changed circum-
stances. Requiring separate notice to her in 1976 would be 
asking American Western to read her mind. 
Nor has Appellant any evidence of the third element of 
estoppel, that American Western suddenly and without warning 
departed from a prior custom. Appellant's objection is instead I 
that American Western continued to do exactly what it had 
always done about sending policy notices: it sent them to 
-26-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald at the same address that they had always gone to. 
evidence is uncontroverted that in December 1976 American 
Western sent notice of lapse to the i'nsured 
at the address 
The 
he and Helen had lived at i'n L (D ogan epo. Helen Mallard 45, 
4 6 ), as Appellant admits in her brief. (Appellant's Brief 
17-18). The notice was returned marked "Return to sender, 
Undeliverable as Addressed, No Forwarding Order." (R. 234). 
Thus, even if a custom had been established and Helen had 
come to rely upon it, American Western did not depart from it. 
Appellant argues that it is a question of fact whether 
American Western's duty extended beyond sending notice of lapse, 
once it was returned by the post office, and whether they were 
required to send someone to try to find her. (Appellant's Brief 
20). The scope of such a duty, of course, is a question of law, 
not fact. Not only does Appellant propose to stretch American 
Western's duty far beyond what is reasonable, the record contains 
no facts which would sustain a holding of estoppel even if the 
duty did extend so far. Appellant cites the testimony of Martin 
Reeder, Ronald's insurance agent, that "as a general rule" 
American Western would notify the agent when notices were 
returned without forwarding address and ask the agent to 
locate the client. (Appellant's Brief 18). "As a general rule" 
does not demonstrate anything like a custom universally 
followed for a substantial period of time. More important, 
Appellant has no evidence whatever that she even knew American 
Western had such a "general rule", let alone that she came to 
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rely upon it. This was obviously the first time that she 
had even encountered the problem with the company. 
Even if all the elements of an estoppel had been 
established, the Appellant's argument still falls short of 
showing that American Western's failure to track down its 
insured was the proximate cause of Helen not knowing the 
policy had lapsed. Helen had agreed both explicitly with 
her ex-husband and by her conduct that American Western 
should send all premium notices to Ronald, not to her. If 
American Western had a duty to locate the insured upon 
receiving the notice back without forwarding address, such a 
duty-extended only so far as to locate Ronald, the insured. 
It is sheerest speculation by Appellant whether Ronald would 
have notified her or not, had American Western made a special 
effort to contact him. Ronald did not tell Helen about the 
change of beneficiary on Policy #44498. There is no reason 
to believe he would have notified her of the lapse of Policy 
#43476, had American Western made a special effort to contact 
him. Thus any failure of American Western cannot be the 
proximate cause of her lack of notice. 
What is apparent, of course, is that Appellant's failure 
to receive the notice was her own fault. She knew that 
American Western had sent all notices of premiums addressed 
in exactly the same manner as the notice of lapse, even after 
Ronald had submitted the change of ownership document in July 
1974. If Appellant now contends that American Western had a 
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duty to send notice of premiums due and policy lapse to her 
as owner by virtue of the 1974 document, she had a reciprocal 
duty to object or to inform the company when it sent the 
premium notice to Ronald in 1974 and 1975. Yet she did 
nothing to object to these premium notices being addressed 
to Ronald. In fact, she herself paid the premiums with 
appliance company funds. Moreover, if she expected American 
l~estern to send notice to her, she had a duty to inform the 
company of her change of address when she moved. She admits 
she made no effort to do so. (Depo. Helen Mallard 25). 
One other factually uncontested matter precludes 
Appellant from recovery on Policy #43476: she has failed to 
tender payment of the premiums due as a prerequisite to 
reinstatement of the policy. In Wickes v. State Farm Mut. 
Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 350, 496 P.2d 267 (1972), the insurer 
had a standing offer to reinstate an auto insurance policy if 
a past due premium was paid within ten days of its due date, 
even though the policy itself had no grace period. The 
insured was killed within two days after the last premium 
was due, yet the beneficiary made no tender of the premium 
within the ten-day grace period established by custom. The 
court held that the insurer would have been bound by its 
standing offer, but the failure to tender payment within the 
ten-day grace period absolutely precluded recovery. In the 
present case, the record is devoid of any evidence Appellant 
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ever tendered the premium due December 1976. Even if American 
Western could not declare the policy lapsed until Helen 
Mallard had actual notice thereof, any reinstatement of the 
policy after the 31-day grace period is expressly conditioned 
upon payment of the past due premium with interest. Appellant 
has failed to satisfy this condition after having actual 
knowledge of lapse, and is therefore precluded from recovery. 
CONCLUSION 
Helen Mallard knew that the insurance Ronald Hooker 
purchased during their marriage was to pay off the mortgage on 
Helen's house. Ronald paid that mortgage in 1977, after their 
divorce. Knowing that, he allowed one policy to lapse, and 
changed the beneficiary on the other to his new wife, Venice. 
Helen now insists that she is entitled not only to have her 
house paid off, as the policies were intended to do, but also 
to more than $140,000 in insurance proceeds besides: $75,000 
on Policy #43476, which Ronald allowed to lapse knowing Helen's 
house would be paid off, and $67,500 on Policy #44498, which 
Ronald left to Venice. 
All Helen's claims are based on the "change of owner-
ship" forms Ronald executed in 1974. Helen contends they 
divested Ronald absolutely and forever of the right to change 
or amend them. Yet by the terms of the policies themselves, 
Ronald retained that right, as the insured, to change or amend 
the policies. Moreover, there is no factual dispute that 
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the policies, including the "change of ownership" forms, were 
intended as security for the mortgage on Helen's house. Upon 
either rationale, Ronald had the right to change the beneficiary 
after he had paid off the mortgage on the house. 
Helen's overreaching is demonstrated further in her 
claim that Policy #43476 could not lapse unless American 
Western had first given her actual notice thereof. Neither 
the policy terms nor any statute require such notice. Helen 
had approved and ratified American Western's procedure of 
sending all notices to Ronald. Helen made no contact with 
American Western to let the company know where she was, how 
she could be contacted, or that she had any continuing interest 
in the policy after the divorce. Yet she asserts that American 
Western must go beyond sending notice of lapse to Ronald, as 
it did, and make special efforts to locate her and inquire 
whether she wanted the policy to lapse. She is not entitled 
to the oroceeds of either policy. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /f~ day of November, 1979. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
John P. Ashton 
John B. Maycock 
Attorneys for Respondent American 
Western LiJ:.e I urance Company 
ti~ ~~ By·~-,.L.._'....!~L.1~_..:::..:.:_::..::..!:.::.._-=;__~-
' ?-' 
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